OpenSSH 10.6p2 Fixes a Password Bypass on Alpine Linux

A single over-long password can open an SSH account that has no password on some musl-based Linux servers. Patches shipped November 5, 2026.

Jach Hoggen
14 Min Read
Photo: Alan Levine / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0
Highlights
  • On November 5, 2026, Alpine Linux and OpenSSH both published fixes for a password authentication bypass in sshd on some musl-based Linux systems.
  • Alpine says an attacker needs one connection and a password between 257 and 1,024 bytes long; no retries are required.
  • The exposed setup is sshd without PAM, PasswordAuthentication enabled, one account with a '*' password field and another with a real $5$ or $6$ hash.
  • Upgrading the package is not enough: Alpine warns that the running sshd keeps using the old code until it is restarted.
  • No CVE had been assigned in the sources reviewed, and the sources report no exploitation in the wild.

OpenSSH has released version 10.6p2 to close a password bypass that affects some Linux systems built on the musl C library when PAM is turned off. On such a server, a very long password can be accepted for an account that has no password at all. Alpine Linux published matching package updates the same day, November 5, 2026. Source: Alpine Linux security advisory.

The bug matters beyond hobby servers because Alpine is also built into container and cloud images, and the researcher says many Alpine-based Docker images are worth checking. Teams may be running it without thinking about it.

This article sticks to what the two primary advisories and the follow-up reporting confirm. Where a source makes a claim that could not be checked, it is labelled as such.

What Was Announced

Alpine’s advisory describes a flaw in which a remote attacker who can reach the SSH port can log in without a password. According to the advisory, the attack succeeds in a single connection and needs no retries. Source: Alpine Linux.

The OpenSSH project released 10.6p2 on November 5, 2026, one month after 10.6p1 on October 6. Its release notes call the update a critical security workaround for one configuration and say the root cause lies outside sshd, although sshd can be exploited through it. Source: OpenSSH release notes.

The notes name the affected setup as Linux systems that use musl libc with PAM support disabled. They do not give a CVE number, a severity score or exploit details.

How the Bypass Works

When sshd is built without PAM, it checks a password by running the typed attempt through the C library’s crypt() function and comparing the result with the value stored for that account. Accounts that have no usable password usually store a single asterisk. Source: Alpine Linux.

Alpine’s advisory says that if the stored field is too short to contain a salt, sshd borrows the salt from another account. That is why the attack needs at least one other local account with a $5$ or $6$ password hash.

257-1,024

Password length in bytes that triggers the bug, per Alpine

1

Connection needed, with no retries, per Alpine

3.16-3.24

Alpine release branches with fixed packages, plus edge

Nov. 5, 2026

Date OpenSSH 10.6p2 and Alpine updates were published

The final piece is musl. Alpine says musl’s crypt() returns an asterisk as an error marker when the key is longer than 256 bytes. The comparison then sees an asterisk on both sides, and sshd treats it as a match. Alpine gives the working range as 257 to 1,024 bytes.

Put simply, the bug is a collision between two meanings of the same character. In /etc/shadow an asterisk means no password can ever match. In musl’s crypt() the same asterisk means the function failed. When sshd compares the two, the failure looks like a correct answer.

Who Is Affected

Alpine lists openssh-server built without PAM, and openssh-server-pam running with UsePAM set to no, as the exposed packages. Password authentication must also be enabled, which is the OpenSSH default. Source: Alpine Linux.

The accounts at risk include root on releases that ship it as root with an asterisk, key-only users created without passwords, and users supplied by directory services such as sssd, winbind or nslcd. Alpine notes that root is protected by default because PermitRootLogin is set to prohibit-password.

Cloud images deserve a closer look. Alpine says its tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship an alpine user with no password and passwordless doas. These images are safe on first boot but become exploitable once any $6$ hash exists, for example through a console password or user-data that sets a hashed password. From there, an attacker could reach the alpine user and use doas to become root.

Alpine also lists directory-service accounts among those at risk. A server that pulls users from a central directory can therefore be exposed even if nobody created a passwordless local account by hand.

SetupAffected?Why
sshd without PAM, passwords enabledYes, if the account conditions are metmusl crypt() error value matches the ‘*’ field
openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yesNoAuthentication goes through PAM
PasswordAuthentication noNoPassword logins are rejected outright
Locked accounts marked ‘!’NoThe stored value cannot match the error marker
Containers that do not run sshdNoNo SSH daemon to attack

The Fixed Versions

Alpine published fixed openssh packages for every branch from 3.16 to 3.24 and for edge. On edge the fixed package is 10.6_p2-r0, and on 3.24 it is 10.3_p1-r2. Source: Alpine Linux.

Alpine also released the point updates 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4, which include the fix. Alpine 3.21 reached end of support on November 1, 2026, yet it still received the patch. Source: LinuxCompatible.

Upgrading the package does not restart a running sshd.

Alpine Linux security advisory, November 5, 2026

What Admins Should Do Now

The advisory’s steps are short. Run apk upgrade -U -a, then restart sshd. A package upgrade alone leaves the old daemon in memory, so the restart is the step people are most likely to miss. Source: Alpine Linux.

If an update is not possible yet, Alpine’s workaround is to disable password authentication. Confirm that key-based login works first and keep your current session open. Then validate the configuration with sshd -t, restart, and check the result with sshd -T.

  • Update the openssh package, then restart sshd and confirm the running version.
  • Set PasswordAuthentication to no if you cannot update immediately, after testing key login.
  • Search /var/log/messages for ‘Accepted password for’ entries on accounts that should have no password.
  • Review doas usage, new users, modified files and authorized keys on any exposed host.
  • Rebuild cloud instances from images at 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, 3.24.4 or later where possible.

Beyond Alpine: What Is Confirmed and What Is Not

OpenSSH’s wording covers Linux systems that use musl with PAM disabled, which is wider than Alpine. A researcher-linked site, sshhole.com, says OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and Docker images built on them could also be exposed. Source: sshhole.com.

That page is promotional and includes a hiring link, and it makes claims that could not be independently checked here. Those include a ten-year exposure window and its test counts. Treat it as a pointer to where to look, not as a confirmed list.

The same site says glibc, PAM-based setups, Dropbear and OpenBSD are not affected. Alpine’s advisory confirms the PAM and PasswordAuthentication cases. Security reporting adds that no CVE had been assigned and that Alpine, OpenSSH and the researcher report no exploitation in the wild and no public exploit code. Source: SecurityOnline.

Some other websites cite a CVE number and a severity score. Neither appears in the Alpine advisory or the OpenSSH release notes, so this article does not repeat them.

Who Found It and Who Fixed It

Alpine credits the report to Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield. The fix was written by Damien Miller and Darren Tucker of the OpenSSH project, with analysis help from Timo Teräs, and Natanael Copa built and uploaded the Alpine packages. Source: Alpine Linux.

The OpenSSH notes say the same researcher reported the bug. They also say the project will make more frequent releases for now so that bugfixes reach users sooner. Source: OpenSSH release notes.

That pace explains why a point release and a distribution update arrived on the same day. It also means administrators who track upstream releases only occasionally may want to check more often over the coming weeks.

What Else Is in OpenSSH 10.6p2

The release is mostly a security update, but it also carries several fixes already on the 10.6 stable branch. The post-quantum hybrid signature scheme ssh-mldsa44-ed25519 is now allowed as a CA signature algorithm in both ssh and sshd, and a CPU spin of under one second when ChannelTimeout was in use is fixed. Source: OpenSSH release notes.

Portability fixes cover compilation on older platforms, Azerbaijani locale detection, agent socket creation on systems without openat(2), and odd behaviour when an interrupt arrived during passphrase entry. restart_syscall(2) is also now allowed in the seccomp sandbox.

Alpine also shipped an unrelated apk-tools crash fix on malformed data in the same point releases, at version 3.0.9 for 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 and 2.14.13 for 3.21.10 and 3.22.8. Source: LinuxCompatible.

What It Means for Canadian and US Teams

None of the sources discussed Canadian or US exposure specifically, and no counts of vulnerable servers were published. The practical point is the base image. Teams that build containers or small cloud images on Alpine should check whether any of them start sshd and allow passwords.

Embedded and router firmware is the open question. The sources do not say which vendors or devices are affected, or when firmware fixes will arrive. Owners of musl-based hardware should watch for vendor notices rather than assume they are safe.

A fair counterpoint is that the conditions are narrow. The attack needs password logins enabled, no PAM, a no-password account and a second account holding a real hash. Many hardened servers meet none of these, and key-only setups with PasswordAuthentication no are unaffected.

What Readers Can Do

If you run servers, check the one setting that blocks the attack: whether password logins are on. For most servers, key-only SSH is the safer default regardless of this bug.

If you do not run servers, the main takeaway is that routine updates matter. This flaw sat in the interaction between two reasonable design choices, and the fix was published on the day of disclosure. Ask your IT provider whether Alpine-based systems are in use and whether the sshd restart was done.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does this affect Ubuntu, Debian or Red Hat servers?

The sources describe the flaw as affecting Linux systems that use musl libc with PAM disabled. Ubuntu, Debian and Red Hat use glibc, and the sources do not list them as affected.

Is there a CVE number for this bug?

Not in the primary sources. Alpine’s advisory says none had been assigned at the time of writing, and the OpenSSH notes give none. Treat CVE numbers on other sites as unconfirmed.

Is it being exploited?

Reporting based on the advisories says Alpine, OpenSSH and the researcher report no exploitation in the wild and no public exploit code. That could change, so patching promptly is still wise.

Is updating the package enough?

No. Alpine warns that upgrading does not restart a running sshd. Restart the service and confirm the new version is the one running.

What if I cannot update today?

Alpine’s workaround is to set PasswordAuthentication to no and restart sshd. Test key-based login first and keep a session open so you are not locked out.

Sources and Further Reading

This article was researched with AI assistance and checked against the sources listed above. Facts are current as of the publication date; follow the source links for updates.

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